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Bankruptcy Law.  In re Kapsinow, 220 A.3d 1231 (R.I. 2019).  A 
bankruptcy debtor may claim certain state law exemptions under 
Rhode Island General Laws section 9-26-4.  The Court examined 
section 9-26-4(11), drawing instruction from language in § 408 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, to determine whether inherited Indi-
vidual Retirement Annuities (IRA) from non-spouse may be ex-
empted under state bankruptcy law.  After analyzing the relevant 
statutes, the Court found that the language of section 9-26-4(11) 
exempts an inherited IRA from a non-spouse.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On October 31, 2016, Lynette Kapsinow (Kapsinow), the 
debtor, filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition.1  Stacy B. Ferrara 
(Ferrara) presided over the matter as the trustee.2  Pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) a debtor may choose state exemptions, which.     
Kapsinow did.3  This option was available to Kapsinow because 
Rhode Island has not opted out of the federal bankruptcy exemption 
scheme; as such, a debtor has the choice between federal or state 
exemptions.4  In Kapsinow’s bankruptcy petition, she attempted to 
exempt an inherited IRA totaling $84,962.88, which was possessed 
by American Century Investments.5  Kapsinow claimed the 
exemption was valid under Rhode Island General Laws section 
9-26-4(11).6  That statute lays out what “goods and property” shall
be exempted from “attachment on any warrant of distress or on any
other writ, original, mesne, or judicial.”7  In pertinent part, the
1. In re Kapsinow, 220 A.3d 1231, 1232–33 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id. at 1233.
3. Id.




7. Id. at 1234.
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statute exempts “an individual retirement account or individual re-
tirement annuity as defined in the Internal Revenue Code, 26 
U.S.C. § 408.”8  Ferrara objected to exemption of the inherited IRA.9  
The IRA Kapsinow sought to exempt was inherited from her 
deceased mother.10  When Kapsinow’s mother passed away, she 
owned an IRA with Aviva Life and Annuity Company of which 
Kapsinow was the beneficiary.11  The account was a “qualified re-
tirement account” under § 408.12  Kapsinow completed an annuity 
claim form for her mother’s IRA seeking to have the proceeds 
transferred to an inherited IRA.13  Aviva Life complied with 
Kapsinow’s request.14  The facts established that following her 
mother’s death, Kapsinow had access to all of the funds in the 
inherited IRA for any reason.15  Kapsinow could not contribute to 
the inherited IRA and had to withdraw minimum distributions.16  
Additionally, the IRA was required to be separate from any of 
Kapsinow’s other accounts.17  The record showed that Kapsinow 
abided by these requirements.18 
On April 12, 2018, the Bankruptcy Court certified to the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court the following issue: “Whether a debtor may 
claim an exemption in an inherited Individual Retirement Annuity, 
including one inherited from a non-spouse, pursuant to R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 9-26-4(11).”19  
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Robinson delivered the Court’s opinion.  The Court
noted that questions of statutory construction are reviewed under 
8. Id.
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a de novo standard.20  The Court began by laying out its methodol-
ogy for questions of statutory construction: “if a statute is clear and 
unambiguous we are bound to ascribe the plain and         ordinary 
meaning of the words of the statute and our inquiry is at an end.”21  
The Court asserted that only when a statute is       susceptible 
to more than one meaning does the Court look to           determine 
legislative intent as a method of statutory construc-
tion.22  The Court added that it would not “construe a     statute to 
reach an absurd result.”23   
The Court then analyzed the statute, which reads, in pertinent 
part: 
The following goods and property shall be exempt from 
attachment on any warrant of distress or on any other writ, 
original, mesne, or judicial:   
. . . . 
(11) An individual retirement account or individual
retirement annuity as defined in the Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 408 and 408A, and the payments or
distributions from such an account or annuity, except that
this exemption does not apply to any of the following:
(i) An order of a court pursuant to a judgment of divorce or
separate maintenance.
(ii) An order of a court concerning child support.
(iii) Contributions to an individual retirement account, or
premiums on an individual retirement annuity, including
the earnings or benefits from those contributions or
premiums that constitute an excess contribution within the
meaning of Section 4973 of the Internal Revenue Code, [26
U.S.C. § 4973].24
The Court held that section 9-26-4(11) unambiguously allowed 
for the exemption of an IRA, if in accordance with § 408.25  Having 
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1234 (quoting Olsen v. DeMayo, 210 A.3d 431, 435 (R.I. 2019)).
22. See id.
23. Id. (quoting Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 1002 (R.I. 2012)).
24. Id. (quoting 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-26-4(11)).
25. Id.
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found no ambiguities in section 9-26-4(11), the Court turned to 
whether § 408 defined an inherited IRA.26 
In analyzing §§ 408(a) and (b), the Court found definitions for 
both “individual retirement account” and “individual retirement 
annuity.”27  Additionally, § 408(d)(3)(C)(ii) provided guidance as to 
when an “individual retirement account” or “individual retirement 
annuity” should be characterized as “inherited.”28  The relevant 
part of § 408(d)(3)(C)(ii) reads: 
An individual retirement account or individual retirement 
annuity shall be treated as inherited if— 
(I) the individual for whose benefit the account or annuity
is maintained acquired such account by reason of the death
of another individual, and
(II) such individual was not the surviving spouse of such
other individual.29
The Court noted that § 408(d)(3)(C)(ii) applied to the rollover of 
IRAs for tax purposes.30  As such, the Court next turned to 
determining whether § 408(d)(3)(C)(ii) constituted a definition of 
inherited IRAs.31  
The Court concluded that § 408 was unambiguous.32  Moreover, 
the Court asserted that § 408 clearly defined inherited IRAs under 
§ 408(d)(3)(C)(ii).33  The Court reasoned that the General Assembly
sought to recognize an exemption for all IRAs defined within
§ 408.34  The Court pointed to the fact that the General Assembly
could have clearly restricted IRA exemptions to any specific
category found within § 408, but did not do so.35  The Court
elaborated that it was not its role to “determine whether a statute




29. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(3)(C)(ii)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1234–35.
33. Id. at 1235.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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ideas of justice, expediency or sound public policy.’”36  As such, the 
Court was constrained by the statute before it.37  The Court went 
on to summarize that since the language of the statute was clear 
and unambiguous, it must only apply the plain meaning of the 
words.38  The Court also noted that its interpretation did not lead 
to an absurd result because other states had expressly exempted 
inherited IRAs.39 
In its analysis, the Court commented on a U.S. Supreme Court 
case raised by the trustee, Clark v. Rameker.40  The Court noted 
that in Clark, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under federal 
bankruptcy statutes, “retirement funds” did not encompass 
inherited IRAs.41  Here, the Court highlighted that Clark was 
instructive of policy considerations, but not controlling, and 
distinguished it from the present case—Clark dealt with a federal 
statute containing the word “retirement funds,” while the present 
case deals with different terminology found within a state statute.42  
Moreover, state bankruptcy statutes may exceed the protections 
found in federal bankruptcy statues.43  As such, the Court held that 
under section 9-26-4(11), a bankruptcy debtor could exempt an 
inherited IRA.44 
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Indeglia delivered a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Suttell, asserting that section 9-26-4(11) unambiguously 
prevented a bankruptcy debtor from exempting an inherited IRA.45  
The dissent deviated from the majority’s statutory construction 
methodology, reasoning that the Court’s “ultimate goal is to give 
effect to the purpose of the [statute] as intended by the 
Legislature.”46  Justice Indeglia acknowledged that if the language 
36. Id. (quoting State v. LeFebvre, 198 A.3d 521, 527 (R.I. 2019)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1236.
40. Id. (citing Clark v. Rameker, 573 U.S. 122 (2014)).
41. Id. (citing Clark, 573 U.S. at 124).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1237.
45. Id.
46. Id. (quoting In re B.H., 194 A.3d 260, 264 (R.I. 2018)).
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of statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court “must interpret the 
statute literally,” making sure to apply the ordinary meaning of the 
words.47  He highlighted that each word or provision in a statute 
has significant meaning; as such, the Court must give due 
consideration to each word or provision.48 
Justice Indeglia provided three reasons why the statute 
unambiguously excluded inherited IRAs from exemption.49  First, 
the statute never used the term “inherited.”50  Furthermore, the 
only support found for the exemption applying to inherited IRAs 
appeared in the Internal Revenue Code, § 408(d)(3)(C)(ii), which 
deals with “tax treatment of distributions.”51  Second, the inherent 
nature of inherited IRAs is far too dissimilar from IRAs.52  As such, 
the Court should not implicitly add inherited IRAs to the language 
of section 9-26-4(11).53   
Lastly, Justice Indeglia reasoned that the policy considerations 
supporting bankruptcy exemptions warranted the exclusion of 
inherited IRAs.54  This conclusion was largely predicated on the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Clark.55  Justice Indeglia reasoned 
that, although the terminology in the federal statute at issue in 
Clark differed from the Rhode Island statute, both statutes referred 
to § 408.56  Justice Indeglia concluded that the policy underlying 
the decision in Clark to exclude inherited IRAs from exemption 
should be followed in the present case.57  In Clark, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reasoned that inherited IRAs did not make up the 
debtor’s personal retirement.58  The Court in Clark rested its 
decision on the policy consideration that bankruptcy exemptions of 
this sort were only applicable to retirement funds.59  Furthermore, 
the Clark Court asserted that the legislative intent behind 








55. Id. at 1239–40.
56. Id. at 1239.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1239–40 (citing Clark v. Rameker, 573 U.S. 122, 124 (2014)).
59. Id. at 1240 (citing Clark, 573 U.S. at 126.).
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bankruptcy exemptions is “to provide a debtor ‘with the basic 
necessities of life’ so that she ‘will not be left destitute and a public 
charge.’”60  Justice Indeglia concluded that, given the policy 
considerations discussed in Clark, the purpose of bankruptcy 
exemptions for retirement funds is to provide a “fresh start” for 
debtors by protecting their retirement fund from creditors.61 
Justice Indeglia closed his dissent by expressing concern that a con-
trary interpretation would result not in a “fresh start,” but rather, 
a “windfall” to the debtor.62 
COMMENTARY 
This case illuminates the contrasting views of what the Court’s 
role should be in deciding questions of statutory construction.  The 
majority rigidly grounded its opinion in the “clear and unambigu-
ous” standard of statutory interpretation while the dissent 
employed a more flexible approach, considering the policy behind 
the statute.  It is clear that the majority believed it gleaned enough 
support for its conclusion in the plain meaning of the words found 
within both the Rhode Island statute and federal bankruptcy 
statute.  The majority deferred consideration of Clark and the 
policies underlying bankruptcy exemptions because under its 
methodology, a clear and unambiguous statute requires no further 
inquiry.  The majority may have taken an overbroad approach in 
concluding that the definition of inherited IRAs found in a provision 
concerning rollover treatment of IRAs for tax purposes sufficiently 
answered affirmatively that the General Assembly intended to 
exempt all IRAs grounded in § 408.  The majority’s approach          
exhibits judicial restraint, and perhaps it is best for the Court to 
refrain from treading into legislative policies when a plain meaning 
can be gleaned from the statute.  As the majority pointed out, the 
General Assembly made no mention of restricting the exemption of 
certain IRAs.  Perhaps it is preferable to leave any sort of change to 
the legislature, thus limiting the Court’s role to interpreting rather 
than justifying.  
On the other hand, the dissent persuasively argued that the 
outcome from exempting inherited IRAs contradicted the purpose 
60. Id. at 1239 (quoting Clark, 573 U.S. at 129 n.3).
61. Id. at 1240.
62. Id.
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of bankruptcy exemption statutes.  The legislative intent behind 
bankruptcy statutes proffered in Clark supports the dissent’s 
conclusion.  The danger of a windfall is surely evident when 
allowing the exemption of an inherited IRA.  Meanwhile, the 
danger of a windfall is alleviated when a debtor is allowed to protect 
his or her own personal retirement from creditors in order to 
recover from bankruptcy. 
Inevitably, discerning whether a correct outcome resulted is 
predicated on what one views as the Court’s role.  Policy 
considerations are instructive, and the Court should seek to 
interpret a statute in a manner that the legislature intended.  
Those who are elected to the legislature may enact any statutory 
changes deemed necessary while the Court should serve its role as 
an interpreter, not a drafter.  
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy 
debtor may exempt an inherited IRA under section 9-26-4(11).  The 
Court held that the language of the relevant statutes clearly and 
unambiguously supported this conclusion.  As such, the Court 
applied the plain meaning of the words within the statute, without 
inquiry into policy considerations. 
 Drew E. Bartlett 
